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Introduction

More than a decade after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and implementation of unconventional monetary policies (UMP), John Taylor’s (1993) interest rate rule remains the
consensus specification of monetary policy in most macroeconomic models. Prominent examples include the benchmark New Keynesian DSGE model in “Rebuilding Macro Theory”
(Vines and Wills, 2018); 150 structural models in the Macroeconomic Model Data Base
(MMB); textbooks at all levels; and even recent innovations in macro models with monetary
policy.1 The Federal Reserve Board still relies on a prototypical Taylor Rule for the federal
funds rate in its primary macro model, FRB/US:
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)[r + πt + ϕπ (πt − π ∗ ) + ϕx xt ] + ϵt

(1)

where it is the nominal interest rate, r is the “natural” (equilibrium) real rate, π is inflation,
π ∗ is target inflation, xt is the output gap (Brayton et al., 2014); the Fed’s Estimated
Dynamic Optimization (EDO) model adds the change in the output gap (Chung et al.,
2010). While particular specifications vary, most macro models still include an equation
close to this one.
The sufficiency of a single rule like equation 1 for monetary policy is being re-examined.
For example, in his AEA Presidential Address, Bernanke (2020) notes that “old methods
won’t do” when implementing policy, and that “[i]f monetary policy is to remain relevant,
policymakers will have to adopt new tools, tactics, and frameworks” [emphasis added]. Introduction of markedly different UMP after 2007 raises questions about whether a single
monetary policy instrument and rule like Taylor’s can adequately represent the full measure
of modern monetary policy in macroeconomic models. On the other hand, Taylor (2021)
still advocates the powerful simplicity of his original rule.
We address this question and the paper’s title by testing for structural breaks in Taylor
1

A short list of innovations includes Gabaix (2020), Barnichon and Mesters (2021), Laurays et al. (2021),
and Fuhrer (2017). For details on MMB see https://www.macromodelbase.com/.
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Rule and non-policy parameters starting in 2007:Q3, the boundary between the Great Moderation (1984-2007) and the period between the GFC and COVID-19 pandemic (2008-2019).2
Identifying UMP is challenging, as explained in Rossi’s (2021) excellent survey. We use three
benchmark macro models that do not include UMP but vary in size and degree of structural
restrictions for robustness: 1) a VAR with modest restrictions; 2) the three-variable New
Keynesian (NK) model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999, 2000); and 3) the DSGE model
of Smets and Wouters (2007). Rossi (2021) focuses on reduced-form models like our VAR
and other creative strategies for identifying monetary shocks. Like Carvahlo et al (2022), we
add two structural models in search of more detailed identification and understanding, but
use full-information estimation of entire macro models in search of breaks due to UMP.3
Although focused on the break in 2007:Q3, the analysis covers 1960-2019 for completeness. Including the period before the Great Moderation (1960-1983) provides a comparison
with earlier literature, starting with the finding by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) that no single
policy variable (fed funds rate or nonborrowed reserves) explains monetary policy from 19651995 without a structural break.4 Previous studies with single-equation and VAR models
typically find evidence of structural breaks occurring between 1979-1983 due to changes in
the Fed’s operating procedure, preferences, and other factors influencing monetary policy.
Likewise, introduction of sudden and sweeping UMP in 2007:Q3 suggests a new structural
break, which is confirmed with an endogenous break test.
Unlike prior research, using the federal funds rate in the Taylor Rule after 2007:Q3 poses
new econometric difficulties that must be addressed. The fed funds rate was stuck at the
effective lower bound (ELB) for nearly seven years (2009-2015) so this truncation may bias
inference for potentially all model parameters.5 Also, implementation of UMP introduced
2

The COVID-19 pandemic and recession precipitated additional unconventional policies, such as Fed
purchases of commercial bonds and direct loans to small businesses, which are too new to properly evaluate
and left for future research.
3
See Fuhrer, Moore, and Schuh (1995) and West and Wilcox (1996) for evidence on the superiority of
FIML estimation to GMM and single-equation OLS.
4
See Table 1 below for prior papers documenting structural breaks in the Taylor Rule.
5
Even prior to the GFC, some papers incorporated the effects of an explicit zero lower bound (ZLB)
constraint on the monetary policy rate. For examples, see Furher and Madigan (1997) and McCallum
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new government behaviors that likely affected structural equations of all models. To circumvent these problems, we use the “shadow” fed funds rate of Wu and Xia (2016); see also
Krippner (2013) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2014). Using a shadow rate indirectly introduces
elements of UMP via the term structure because Forward Guidance (FG) and Quantitative
Easing (QE) affect longer term rates. Our strategy alters the nature of contemporary structural break tests relative to past research by including elements of the very object (UMP)
the test seeks to identify. Consequently, the structural break test is a joint test of the Taylor
Rule and sufficiency of the shadow rate specification of UMP.
Despite using a shadow fed funds rate, we find statistically and economically significant
evidence of structural breaks in the parameters of the Taylor Rule and non-policy equations.
The post-GFC Taylor Rule shows the Fed is less responsive to changes in both inflation and
the output gap after 2008, more so the former. While breaks in Taylor Rule coefficients are
larger than the small-sample estimation biases noted in Carvahlo et al (2021), the changes
have economically moderate implications for the macro models. This begs the question:
given the large, unconventional nature of changes in monetary policy, why isn’t there clear
evidence of a greater effect? Perhaps the reason is because changes emerged elsewhere in
the models. Indeed, many aspects of the non-policy structure of the economy also changed
significantly after 2007:Q3. For examples, agents became more sensitive to changes in the real
interest rate and expected inflation; steady state growth and inflation fell; and the Phillips
Curve flattened. Some of these breaks may be related to policy changes, as in the Lucas
Critique (Lucas 1976). Other coefficient breaks likely are not directly related to monetary
policy, although they could influence the setting of optimal policy as well. Perhaps most
surprisingly, estimation using the effective fed funds rate gives similar results, albeit with
higher persistence (ρ).
Structural breaks also manifest themselves in economically significant changes in three
key characteristics of the estimated models beyond the parameters. Structural shocks esti(2000).

3

mated over subsamples exhibit change in their relative volatility and autoregressive properties, which influences estimation of the Taylor Rule (Carvahlo et al., 2022). After 2007:Q3,
the variance and persistence of DSGE monetary shocks increased. The models’ dynamic
properties (impulse responses) also vary across subsamples. Dynamic differences are less evident when all parameters are allowed to change, but counterfactual exercises holding either
Taylor Rule or non-policy coefficients fixed at full-sample estimates show considerably larger
differences across subsamples. After 2007:Q3, the DSGE output and inflation responses to
monetary policy shocks reverted back their magnitudes before the Great Moderation, which
now looks more like an outlier period. Finally, subsample breaks in DSGE coefficients significantly affect estimates of the model-consistent output gap. The full-sample output gap
deviates significantly from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) output gap used by the
VAR and NK models. The break-adjusted DSGE output gap much more closely resembles
the CBO gap.
Together, the results suggest that using a UMP proxy (shadow funds rate) in macro
models may not sufficiently capture the richness of contemporary monetary policy for at least
two reasons. First, the prevalence of breaks in non-policy structural parameters suggests that
time-variation in aspects of the macro models is important but missing. Thus, it is difficult
to tell whether the observed breaks reflect time-variation unrelated to UMP rather or are
the effects of UMP. Perhaps the most likely time variation occurred in steady state output
growth and the natural real rate of interest. Controlling for time-variation in these and other
variables and equations is an important extension of the benchmark models necessary for
more conclusive break tests.
A second concern is the models do not include explicit, comprehensive structure that fully
incorporates UMP. This limitation may be leading to an omitted variables (and equations)
problem that appears as structural breaks in the estimated parameters. The natural remedy
is include explicit, comprehensive specifications of UMP in the macro models. Efforts to
do so are emerging but still limited thus far. Introduction of FG after 2007:Q3 mainly has
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been modeled and estimated (or calibrated) as the addition of policy announcement shocks
to the Taylor Rule.6 Modeling QE has occurred mainly in theoretical models that introduce
banks and their balance sheets to capture bond holdings and bank reserve management.7 One
promising paper that combines these two strands is Wu and Zhang (2019), which microfounds
a central bank’s bond holdings in an effort to map unconventional policies into a single
“shadow” fed funds rate to be used in a standard Taylor Rule. Estimted macro models with
UMP would be better-suited to identify the effects of policy changes.

2

Previous Literature

Table 1 lists the main papers reporting evidence on structural breaks in the Taylor Rule. The
structure of the Rule has stayed largely the same as the original specification except for the
addition of persistence (it−1 ), allowance for output dynamics (growth rate or gap change),
and variation in lags or other practical features as shown in Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2012).8 The literature contains a variety of different modeling and econometric methods
used to estimate breaks in the Taylor Rule coefficients. However, the results tend to be
broadly consistent across papers.
Regime-switching models and break point tests, like those in Estrella and Fuhrer (2003)
and Duffy and Engle-Warnick (2004) consistently show a regime change somewhere in the late
1970s or early 1980s followed by another in the mid 1980s. This result follows closely with the
traditional narrative that the Federal Reserve undertook a “Monetarist experiment” during
this period, wherein the Fed targeted the growth of a monetary aggregate rather than an
interest rate. Using a single-equation model, Bunzel and Enders (2010) find these regimes
appear in the Taylor Rule as a regime characterized by strong output gap and inflation
responses (1970s) followed by a regime characterized by gradual adjustment of the federal
6

For more on forward guidance, see Del Negro, et. al (2012), Bundick and Smith (2016), Campbell et. al
(2017) and McKay et. al (2016).
7
For examples on modeling QE, see the Gerler and Karadi (2011, 2013) and Joyce et. al (2012).
8
For examples, see the monetary policy rules in Macro Modelbase: https://www.macromodelbase.com/
files/documentation_source/mmb-mprule-description.pdf?40780101f6.
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funds rate (post 1980s). However, Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) note that these regime changes
could be caused by changes elsewhere in the economy that smaller, single-equation models
cannot estimate. Further, as Carvalho et al. (2022) show, the estimation methodology is
important to any examination of Taylor Rule coefficients. Any estimation of monetary policy
is subject to an endogeneity issue, as the central bank influences and responds to changes in
inflation and output. Nevertheless, Carvalho et al. (2022) find that simple OLS estimates of
the Taylor Rule still outperform IV estimates while still producing largely consistent model
dynamics.
Researchers also have attempted to find structural breaks in VAR models. Using a
factor-augmented VAR, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) find that no simple policy variable
fully captures monetary policy from 1965-1996. Instead, they find regime switches in the
Fed’s operating procedure in roughly 1979 and 1982, similar to the single-equation breakpoint models. Using structural VARs, Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006) find similar
timing of the regime changes but emphasize they are characterised by changes in the variance
of Taylor Rule coefficients, as well as changes in the coefficient point estimates. In essence,
the structural VARs suggest that monetary policy after the mid-1980s is characterized best
by more consistent responses to output and inflation.
Other researchers estimated changes in the Taylor Rule using full structural models. Using an RBC model with money for 1966-1982 and 1990-2006 subsamples, Castelnuovo (2012)
finds the Taylor Rule parameters are largely unchanged across subsamples, but the fed funds
rate is less responsive to money growth in the second sample. Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) find that, while the Fed satisfied the Taylor principle in the 1970’s, changes in the
Taylor Rule induced determinacy during the Volcker disinflation, helping stabilize inflation.
Using the same NK model and Bayesian methods as this paper (Clarida, Gali, Gertler 1999),
Canova (2009) finds the Fed responds more strongly to inflation after 1982, likely contributing to the Great Moderation (Stock and Watson 2002). Using the Smets and Wouters’
(2007) model for 1966-1979 and 1983-2005 subsamples, Ilbas (2012) similarly finds the Fed
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is more responsive to inflation after 1983 as well as greater interest-rate smoothing and a
lower inflation target during the Great Moderation era.
We extend this literature by using a representative sample of three multi-equation models
to investigate whether an additional structural break occurred in 2007:Q3, as might be
expected. For robustness and reassurance, we first replicate the finding of a structural break
in the early-1980s, as shown in Table 2. Our results are consistent with previous papers based
on model type: during the Great Moderation, the VAR shows a decline in the variance of
the estimated parameters while the NK and DSGE models show greater responsiveness to
inflation.

3

Models

We use three benchmark macro models to estimate the Taylor Rule and test for structural
breaks. For robustness, the models vary in size (small- to medium-scale) and degree of
structure (few to many cross-equation restrictions).

3.1

Taylor Rules

The models contain two slightly different variants of the Taylor Rule. The VAR and NK
models include a simplified version of the FRB/US Taylor Rule (equation 1),

it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)[ϕπ (πt − π ∗ ) + ϕx xt )] + ϵt ,

(2)

which assumes a (suppressed) constant equilibrium nominal rate (r + π ∗ ). The output gap,
xt = (yt − y P OT ), uses potential output (POT) from the Congressional Budget Office.9 The
DSGE model adds short-run feedback from the change in the output gap as Smets and
9

See https://www.cbo.gov/data/budget-economic-data.
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Wouters (2007):

f
p
rtf = ρrt−1
+ (1 − ρ)[ϕπ πt + ϕy (yt − ytp )] + ϕ∆y [(yt − ytp ) − (yt−1 − yt−1
)] + ϵt ,

(3)

where rtf = it to momentarily sidestep notation conflict (SW use i for investment and r for
the nominal rate); henceforth, it is the nominal rate unless noted otherwise. Equation (3)
uses the DSGE concept of potential output, y p , which denotes the level that would prevail
if prices were flexible and there were no markups. Estimates of ρ and the ϕ parameters
provide evidence on stability of the Taylor Rule across subsamples. In contrast, Carvahlo et
al. (2022) estimate their models with a Taylor Rule in which the Fed only targets inflation,
rather than inflation and the output gap.
Neither the Taylor Rules nor the macro models incorporate UMP. However, some papers
have incorporated Forward Guidance (FG) into the Taylor Rule using the effective fed funds
rate and FG shocks to the future policy rate as follows:

P
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)[ϕπ (πt − π ∗ ) + ϕx xt )] + ϵM
+
t

L
X

ϵR
l,t−l

(4)

l=1

where

PL

R
l=1 ϵl,t−l

P
are FG shocks to the interest rate at time l, but realized at t − l and ϵM
t

are the standard monetary shocks.10 A FG shock is the difference between actual it and the
expected rate announced by the central bank at time t − l. Thus, FG on future policy rates
essentially extends the duration of the short-term rate at the ELB.11
Although the FG-augmented Taylor Rule does not account explicitly for the quantitative
easing (QE) portion of UMP, it is mathematically similar to the FG shock in the literature
on QE and shadow federal funds rates. As noted by scholars from Black (1995) to Rossi
(2021), the shadow rate is an option, i.e., the short-term interest rate implied by a model of
10

See Del Negro et al. (2012), Campbell et al. (2012), and Cole (2021). This specification also is called
“forecast targeting” by Svensson (2017). Reserch with such models find a “Forward Guidance puzzle” of
excessively large responses to FG news. The shadow fed funds rate controls for the effects of FG.
11
See Section 7 for more discussion of the relationship between FG and UMP.
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the yield curve. Wu and Zhang (2019) provide a mapping of QE into a standard NK model
through the shadow rate. To do this, they assume the shadow rate, st , follows the Central
Bank (CB) balance sheet according to:

P
st = −ζ(bCB
− bCB ) + ϵFt G + ϵM
t
t

(5)

where ζ maps the shadow rate to the difference between bond holdings, bCB
t , and their steady
P
state level and ϵFt G is forward guidance, and ϵM
is the difference between the actual and
t

predicted shadow rates.
Figure 1 shows the shadow rate closely tracks Fed bond holdings with only three key
deviations, which Wu and Zhang (2019) note coincide with the Fed’s changes in FG. The
early 2010 deviation coincides with the Fed signaling it would unwind its lending facilities.
The 2014 decline coincides with the Fed extending its forecasted duration of the ELB. And
the early 2013 spike coincides with the “taper tantrum” and is presented as a traditional
monetary shock. In other words, deviations of the shadow rate from the Fed’s balance sheet
present themselves similarly to the FG shock.
In short, by using the shadow rate we avoid the need to include the forward guidance augmented Taylor Rule in our estimation because st incorporates forward guidance. Moreover,
st also includes the effect of quantitative easing, allowing us to incorporate both aspects of
unconventional monetary policy. Henceforth, we refer to the interest rate as iˆt where:
bit = min(it , st )

(6)

to economize on notation later. The advantage of using the shadow rate is it allows for
uniform comparison of the stance of monetary policy across conventional and unconventional
policy periods.

9

3.2

VAR Model

The VAR model is based on the three-variable vector, Zt = [xt , πt , bit ]′ that includes the
output gap, inflation (πt ) and sample-specific policy rate. Abstracting from constant terms,
the structural form is
B0 Zt =

k
X

(7)

Bi Zt−1 + ut ,

i=1

where the 3x1 vector of structural shocks, ut , is identified from the Cholesky decomposition




1
0
0




B0 = 
κ
1
0




(1 − ρ)ϕx (1 − ρ)ϕπ 1

(8)

with usual diagonal covariance matrix, Σ = ut u′t : The ordering restrictions allow the output
gap to respond only to its own innovations and hence move the slowest. Inflation responds
contemporaneously to the output gap and its own innovations, while the Fed’s policy rate
responds to shocks in both the output gap and inflation as in the standard Taylor Rule.
This ordering identification originated with Sims (1980) but still is central to Rossi’s
(2021) contemporary analysis. Our modest structural extension imposes interest-rate smoothing by restricting ρ = Γ3,1 , which is the (3,1) element of the first lag (k = 1) of the reducedform coefficient matrix, Γ1 = B0−1 B1 .

3.3

New Keynesian (NK) Model

The three-equation NK model is from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999, 2000) and uses the
same variables as the VAR. In addition to the Taylor Rule in equation (2), the NK model
imposes structural restrictions in the form of the IS equation and forward-looking Phillips
Curve:
xt = ψ[ibt − Et πt+1 ] + Et xt+1 + ϵx,t
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(9)

πt = κxt + βEt πt+1 + ϵπ,t

(10)

where β is the discount factor, ψ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and κ is the slope
of the Phillips Curve. Structural shocks ϵx,t , ϵπ,t , and ϵi,t follow an AR(1) process:

ϵx,t = ρx ϵx,t−1 + ηx,t

(11)

ϵπ,t = ρπ ϵπ,t−1 + ηπ,t

(12)

ϵi,t = ρi ϵi,t−1 + ηi,t

(13)

where 0 < ρx,t , ρπ,t , ρi,t < 1 capture the persistence of shocks and ηx,t , ηπ,t , ηi,t are i.i.d. with
zero mean and variances σx2 , σπ2 , and σi2 , respectively. The model has nine parameters: six
structural parameters (β, ψ, κ, ρ, ϕπ , ϕy ) and three auxiliary parameters (ρx , ρπ , ρi ).

3.4

DSGE Model

The medium-scale DSGE model is from Smets and Wouters (2007), which contains the full
linearized version. In addition to the Taylor Rule in equation (3), the portion of the DSGE
model that most closely matches the NK model are the consumption Euler equation and
expectations-augmented NK Phillips Curve:

ct = c1 ct−1 + (1 − c1 )Et ct+1 + c2 (lt − Et lt+1 ) − c3 (it − Et πt+1 + εbt )

(14)

πt = π1 πt−1 + π2 Et πt+1 − π3 µpt + εpt

(15)

where ct is real consumption, lt is hours worked, µpt is the price markup, and ϵbt , ϵpt are
structural shocks. The ci and πi are parameters to be estimated.12
The DSGE model is more comprehensive and imposes stronger cross-equation restrictions
than the NK model. For example, the NK IS Curve (9) is obtained from the simplifying
12

For a more comprehensive summary of the SW DSGE model, see Chung, Herbst, and Kiley (2015).
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assumption that yt = ct in the forward-looking consumption Euler equation. The DSGE
model does not impose this assumption but explicitly models the entire aggregate resource
constraint. Similarly, the NK Phillips Curve (10) is the linearized form of the firm’s simplified
exogenous pricing decision. The DSGE model adds backward- looking elements into the
consumption Euler equation and Phillips Curve plus a price mark-up in addition to sticky
price adjustment.
The DSGE model has other advantages. It is consistent with a steady-state growth
path, incorporating investment decisions and the pricing and accumulation of capital into
its optimization problems. The DSGE model also has a more complex stochastic environment
with seven structural shocks (productivity, technology, risk premium, spending, monetary,
price-markup, and wage-markup) compared with three (demand, cost-push, and monetary),
allowing richer and more flexible estimation of the effects of monetary policy.

4

Econometric Specifications

Most data used in this paper come from the FRED database created by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. The VAR and NK models use: 1) the output gap constructed with the
CBO’s real potential GDP; 2) core PCE inflation; and 3) the short-term policy rate, bit . The
DSGE model uses the same data as Smets and Wouters (2007) but is updated and extended
through 2019 and also uses bit . The shadow federal funds rate comes from the work of Wu
and Xia (2016) and is downloaded from Cynthia Wu’s website.13

4.1

Selection of Samples

The full data sample runs from 1960:Q1 to 2019:Q4. The starting period is consistent with
the literature and constrained by availability of the PCE price index data. We truncate
the sample in 2019 to exclude the new UMP that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic
13

See https://sites.google.com/view/jingcynthiawu/shadow-rates?authuser=0
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and recession. The period during which the Fed targeted non-borrowed reserves (1979:Q4
to 1982:Q4) is included in the full sample rather than using arbitrary estimation methods
to address missing observations.14
Based on the literature and conventional wisdom about known breaks in monetary policy,
the subsamples are: I) 1960:Q1 to 1978:Q4; II) 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q2 (Great Moderation);
and III) 2007:Q3 to 2019:Q4 (Global Financial Crisis, or GFC). The entire period 1979:Q1
to 1983:Q4 is omitted from subsamples I and II to avoid complications associated with
policy changes to and from targeting of non-borrowed reserves, and because the exact dates
of the estimated break points in the literature are heterogeneous (Table 1). Differences
between econometric estimates from periods I and II are clearer this way, but the results are
qualitatively similar (robust) to results when the non-borrowed reserve period is included in
either period I or II (or in between). The beginning of sample III (2007:Q3) corresponds to
the Fed’s initial rate cuts and early events of the financial crisis, such as American Home
Mortgage’s bankruptcy, BNP Parabas noting a decline in liquidity, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average’s peak.
For robustness, we provide some formal evidence on the selected break points by estimating a split-sample Chow test for the VAR and testing for structural breaks (Lutkepohl,
2013). Figure 2 shows the p-value from the rolling window estimation; the horizontal dashed
line indicates the 5 percent confidence level. The Chow test largely confirms our a priori
reasoning on the subsample selection: structural breaks corresponding to the Fed’s changes
in operating procedure in 1979Q3 and 1983Q1, as well as one near the start of the financial
crisis in 2007Q3 (both indicated by the vertical dashed lines). For this reason, we continue
the tradition in the literature of setting the break periods exogenously rather than using
more complicated endogenous break-point methods. Additional potential breaks during the
first subsample (I) are assumed not to be associated with monetary policy.
14
Although the period of monetary targeting is volatile and influential in estimation, it is less so in the
full sample than in the shorter subsamples.
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4.2

Estimation

The VAR is estimated using OLS so these Taylor Rule estimates are consistent with the
recommendation of Carvahlo et al. (2021). The model has k = 1 lag for each sample for
consistency and to conserve on degrees of freedom. The structural parameters are derived
from B0 and the first own-lagged coefficient in the bit equation. Standard errors are obtained
from the “delta” method (Oehlert, 1992).
The NK and DSGE models are estimated with standard Bayesian methods. Selection
of priors has a significant bearing on the estimated parameters, so changing priors between
subsamples can potentially bias results toward a structural break when one does not truly
exist. To mitigate this bias, and for consistency with earlier research, we use the same prior
distribution, mean, and standard deviation in the full sample and all subsamples: Canova’s
(2009) for the NK model and Smets and Wouters’ (2007) for the DSGE model.15 The
likelihood function is calculated using the Kalman filter. The posterior density distribution
is obtained from the calculated likelihood function and prior distributions, continuing until
convergence is achieved. Then the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to create 2,000
draws of the posterior distribution and approximate moments of the distribution.16
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the DSGE output gap is generated from the model
as the deviation from the level of output that would prevail with flexible wages and prices,
ytp . This model-generated output gap differs from the output gap used in the VAR and NK
models in two ways. First, the latter uses CBO’s estimate of potential output derived from
an independent growth-accounting framework.17 Second, because CBO estimates potential
output for the full sample it does not change across subsamples; in contrast, the DSGE
output gap is estimated separately for each subsample and thus is subject to breaks in the
15

See Appendix A for a list of parameters, their roles in the model, and their priors.
Estimation is performed using a modified version of Johannes Pfeifer’s dynare code for Smets and
Wouter’s model. Pfeifer’s code can be found at https://github.com/JohannesPfeifer/DSGE_mod/tree/
master/Smets_Wouters_2007, and Dynare can be downloaded at https://dynare.org.
17
See
Shackleton
(2018),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/
workingpaper/53558-cbosforecastinggrowthmodel-workingpaper.pdf.
16
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models’ structural parameters.

5

Estimation Results

This section reports coefficient estimates and evidence of structural breaks in model parameters. Tables 2 and 3 include Taylor Rule and other non-policy coefficient estimates,
respectively, for the full sample (Full) and each subsample (I-III). There are two subsample
III periods depending on which funds rate is used: IIIbi (shadow funds rate) and IIIi (fed
funds rate). The tables also include coefficient changes between subsamples and, for the
VAR model, significance of the t-tests for differences. As noted in Section 2, the break-test
results for subsamples I and II are generally consistent with the prior literature, so this
section focuses on comparing subsamples II and III. Coefficient magnitudes may vary across
models due to differences in model variables and structure, and thus should be compared
mainly across subsamples within models.

5.1

Taylor Rule Parameters

Table 2 reports estimates of the Taylor Rule parameters. During the Great Moderation,
the estimated coefficients (column II) are broadly consistent with the prior literature.18 The
Fed responds more to the inflation gap than output gap when setting interest rates i.e.,
ϕπ >> ϕy .19 The difference between these coefficients is largest in the DSGE model (1.97
versus .09). Interest rate persistence is similar across models but a bit lower in the NK model
(approximately .6 versus .8). The DSGE model also shows a significant response to output
growth (ϕ∆y ).
After the GFC, the estimated coefficients (column IIIbi) generally remained statistically
significant but tended to revert back toward their period-I values (column I). In all three
18

Specifically, the Great Moderation point estimates for ϕπ are consistent with those estimated in Carvalho
et al. (2022) via both OLS (2.75) and IV (2.63). While the subsample I estimates differ, their estimates
have high standard errors.
19
Similarly, (ϕπ /ϕy ) is larger in subsample II than I
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models, the Fed became less responsive to inflation as ϕπ declined by economically large
and statistically significant amounts, although the VAR estimate (−1.61) is the wrong sign
and not significantly different from zero. Changes in the other coefficients generally were
smaller in absolute value and less systematic and significant. The response to output (ϕy )
increased (.12) significantly in the DSGE model but declined significantly in the VAR (−1.02)
and insignificantly in the NK model (−.05). Persistence (ρ) increased significantly (.16) in
the NK model but decreased significantly (−.09) in the DSGE model and was essentially
unchanged in the VAR. The Fed’s response to output growth (ϕ∆y ) also was essentially
unchanged.
Table 2 also includes parameter estimates for the post-GFC period using the traditional
effective federal funds rate (IIIi). Surprisingly, the fed funds coefficients are quite similar
to those using the shadow rate (IIIbi). In fact, the coefficient magnitudes are essentially the
same statistically with only a few key exceptions. In the VAR model, ϕπ is positive and
much larger but still not significantly different from zero. In the NK model, ϕy is only half
as large (.31 versus .64). And in the DSGE model, the interest rate is economically more
persistent (ρ = .92 versus .75), presumably because the funds rate was constrained by the
ELB from 2009-2015. The striking similarity between columns IIIbi and IIIi raises questions
about the extent to which the shadow funds rate proxies for UMP.

5.2

Non-policy Parameters

Table 3 reports estimates of the models’ non-policy parameters. During the Great Moderation, these coefficients (column II) are generally, albeit roughly, consistent with the prior
literature. In the NK model, the slope of the IS Curve (ψ) is negative and small in absolute
value, implying a relatively high coefficient of relative risk aversion of about 50. The slope of
the Phillips Curve (κ) and the expectations feedback are both positive and relatively high but
significantly less than 1.0. The VAR and NK estimates of κ are very similar except during
the Great Moderation (column II), where the NK slope is considerably more positive. The
16

DSGE model has too many parameters to discuss individually, but the coefficient estimates
are roughly in line with those reported in Smets and Wouters (2007) and subsequent estimates of their model. Unlike the Taylor Rule parameters, the NK and DSGE coefficients are
not directly comparable due to substantial differences in the size and structural restrictions
of the two models.
After the GFC, many of the estimated non-policy coefficients (column III) in the NK
and DSGE models exhibit significant changes. Unlike the Taylor Rule coefficients, however,
there was not a general reversion back to period-I values but rather heterogeneous breaks in a
variety of coefficients. In the NK model, the IS Curve slope (ψ) became more negative (−.19
versus −.03) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion fell to about 9 and the output gap
is more sensitive to the real rate. The Phillips Curve slope (κ) declined considerably (.38 to
.03), returning to its approximate value before the Great Moderation. Inflation expectations
(β) also decreased somewhat (.91 to .82) but remained much closer to the rational benchmark
(1.0) than before the Great Moderation.
In the DSGE model, several coefficients changed notably after the GFC. Two long-run
coefficient, steady state growth (γ) and hours (l), fell by economically and statistically
significant amounts (.48 to .21 and .79 to −3.52, respectively). In contrast, steady state
inflation (π) essentially was unchanged. The capital share (α) declined by almost half and
the external habit (λ) increased notably (.51 to .83). The DSGE model also provides an
estimates the natural real interest rate as a function of the rate of time preference, β, and
risk aversion, σc .20 Estimates for periods I and II are larger than many in the literature but
similar to the original estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007). In period III, the real rate
estimates fell almost in half (3.1 to 1.7 percent). The remaining DSGE coefficients did not
change statistically significantly.
20

σc

The natural real interest rate is calculated as in Smets and Wouters (2007): r̄ = ( γ β Π − 1)100.
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5.3

Discussion

Evidence in this section suggests the presence of structural breaks in many coefficients. However, the analysis cannot verify econometrically whether the presence of UMP is responsible
for the observed breaks without a clear alternative model that includes UMP, as discussed
in Section 7.2. Nevertheless, it is instructive to summarize the results thus far and assess
whether they provide suggestive evidence of changes in monetary policy. Three comparisons
offer useful information and perspective:
• Parameter types – The structural breaks occur in both Taylor Rule (policy) and nonpolicy coefficients. This finding makes it even more difficult to isolate the effects of
omitted policies on the Taylor Rule. Because the policy and non-policy parameters
are estimated jointly, changes in the latter can influence estimates of the former.
• Subsamples – Structural breaks after the Financial Crisis (from II-III) are not always
consistent with breaks during the Great Moderation (from I-II). For some parameters,
breaks are statistically significant in only one period while for others it is significant in
both (or neither). For some coefficients the breaks reverse sign from period II to period
III, making the post-GFC coefficients similar to those before the Great Moderation,
which is hard to explain.
• Models – Structural breaks are hard to compare between the parsimonious small models (VAR, NK) and the larger DSGE model. While none of the models includes UMP,
the DSGE model has more variables that are likely to be influenced (directly or indirectly) by UMP. Thus, it is difficult to identify whether coefficient changes, especially
non-policy, are due to omitted monetary policies or to changes in the private-sector
economic structure.
Thus, the evidence presented thus far does not conclusively indicate whether UMP is responsible for the comprehensive and heterogeneous structural breaks in model parameters.
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6

Additional Diagnostics

Motivated by the evidence thus far, this section examines additional diagnostic measures:
1) estimated structural shocks; 2) dynamic responses to structural shocks; and 3) estimated
DSGE output gaps. These measures provide further evidence of structural breaks in period
III and a fuller understanding of the economic nature of the observed changes.

6.1

Structural shocks

The time series characteristics of each model’s estimated structural shocks provide one way
to summarize the comprehensive impact of parameter breaks. Figure 3 plots the estimated
monetary policy shocks for each model from the full sample and each subsample.21 The
correlation of monetary shocks between models varies from .83 to .91 the full sample. For
the subsamples, the correlations vary from .54 (the VAR:NK correlation in period II) to .90
(the NK:DSGE correlation in period III.)
The full-sample monetary shocks for periods I and II are familiar and similar across
models. The variance is greatest in period I, but even larger during the period of reserves
targeting (1980-1983). The variance declined significantly during the Great Moderation due
to “better monetary policy”, a phenomenon Stock and Watson (2002) and some others found
to be the most influential cause of the Moderation. However, aside from some relatively modest fluctuations during the GFC recession, the full-sample monetary shock in period III did
not exhibit another large change in variance (decrease or increase) following implementation
of UMP.
The relative variances of the monetary shocks in each subsample also are instructive.22
In period I, the subsample VAR and NK shocks are more volatile than the full-sample shock
(ratios of 1.43 and 1.46, respectively), but the DSGE shock is much less variable (ratio
of .35). While differences in shock variances across models are not surprising, the models
21

See Figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix for plots of other structural shocks in the NK and DSGE models.
See Table 4 in the Appendix for the full-sample standard deviations and the variance ratios for each
subsample shock relative to its full-sample variance.
22
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exhibit heterogeneous changes in their shock variance ratios across subsamples as well. For
the VAR and NK models, the monetary shock variance ratios in periods II and III (roughly
.5 in both subsamples) are about one-third as large as in period I. In contrast, the DSGE
monetary shock variance ratios in periods II and III (.13 and .39, respectively) are similar
to period I. Thus, the DSGE monetary shock becomes three times more variable in period
III but there is not much change in the volatility of the VAR and NK shocks.
The autoregressive properties of the monetary shocks also vary not only across models
but also across subsamples within the models.23 Persistence of the NK and DSGE monetary
shocks generally increased in periods II and III, but the increase was statistically significant
only in the DSGE model in period III (.31 to .54).
Changes in the time series properties of the estimated monetary shocks indirectly reflect
the effects of changes in the estimated coefficients of Taylor Rule and non-policy structural
equations reported in Section 5. While the estimated model coefficients exhibit various
breaks, the time series properties of the monetary shocks in period III reveal moderate
changes in variability and persistence. The changes are larger and more significant in the
DSGE model (more variable and more persistent) perhaps because it contains more parameters and thus more opportunities to capture and interpret the breaks.24

6.2

Impulse Responses

Changes in the Taylor Rule and non-policy parameters also affect the dynamic properties
of the macro models. Figure 4 shows impulse responses to a 100-basis-point shock to the
federal funds rate for the full sample and each subsample; recall that the post-GFC period
(III) uses bit . These subsample impulse responses are unrestricted, allowing all policy and
non-policy coefficients to change in each subsample.
The unrestricted responses are broadly consistent with prior evidence for each model and,
23

See Table 5 in the Appendix for complete set of autoregressive parameters for each model and sample.
The time series properties of the other estimated NK and DSGE structural shocks also exhibit a variety
of changes but there are too many to discuss here. See the Appendix for more details and discussion of these
other shocks.
24
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with few exceptions, qualitatively similar across models and samples. Monetary tightening
produces a familiar, modest decline in output and inflation, followed by a slow return to
steady state for about 1-3 years. The funds rate paths are nearly the same, decaying slowly
from 100 basis points in a similar fashion across models with only modest differences in the
degree of persistence. This result is consistent with the finding in Carvahlo et al (2021) that
different estimation methods provide largely unbiased impulse response functions, although
estimation methods may vary in precision.
However, the output gap and inflation responses exhibit somewhat larger and more economically important quantitative differences across models and subsamples. For example,
although the average output response is similar across models and samples, the absolute
magnitude of output responses varies more across samples in the VAR and NK models than
the DSGE model. Also, the DSGE has notably larger (in absolute value) and economically
different inflation responses than the other models. In particular, the full sample responses
are notably more muted for the NK model. Interestingly, no subsample response consistently matches the full-sample responses across models. A lack of consistency across models
perhaps is to be expected given their different sizes and restrictions, but the relative inconsistency of subsample responses across models is striking. That is, the largest absolute
response for each model is not associated with the same subsample.
Although subsample heterogeneity across responses may be providing additional evidence
of structural breaks, most differences are economically moderate for at least two reasons.
First, as noted in Section 6.1, the variances and persistence of the structural shocks change
considerably across subsamples, which also impact the coefficient estimates. Unlike the
monetary shock fixed at 100 basis points, impulse responses based on shocks’ estimated
standard deviations (not displayed but available upon request) vary much more. Second,
data-consistent dynamics are the inherent goal of model estimation. Thus, while breaks
in the economic structure may occur in some coefficients (e.g., the Taylor Rule), offsetting
breaks in other parameters (e.g., non-policy) may occur simultaneously to maintain dynamic
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properties consistent with the data.
To better understand the effects of structural breaks in Taylor Rule parameters, we
conducted a counterfactual exercise in which the non-policy parameters are held fixed at
their full-sample estimates. Figure 5 shows impulse responses to a 100-basis point fed funds
shock using models in which only Taylor Rule coefficients change across subsamples, thus
better illustrating the effects of structural breaks in policy on model dynamics.25
The counterfactual responses reveal three important insights. First, absolute magnitudes
are roughly two to three times larger than the unrestricted responses (Figure 4) for all but
the DSGE inflation response, which is about the same. Second, the counterfactual responses
are much more consistent across subsamples with smaller qualitative differences. Third, the
Great Moderation ( period II) responses more consistently differ from the pre-Moderation
(period I) and post-Crisis (period III) responses, which are similar to each other. The Great
Moderation output and inflation responses are smaller (more negative) in the NK model,
and vice versa for the DSGE model. Except for the Great Moderation response, the NK
fed funds rate responses exhibit a short-lived amplification after the shock while the DSGE
responses do not. Overall, these counterfactual responses show that breaks in the non-policy
parameters mute the volatility of responses differing only in Taylor Rules. Changes in Taylor
Rule coefficients across samples and models thus have limited effects on model dynamics.
For completeness, Figure 6 shows impulse responses to a 100-basis point fed funds shock
for the converse counterfactual exercise. The Taylor Rule coefficients are held fixed at their
full-sample estimates and only non-policy parameters change across subsamples, thus better
illustrating the effects of changes in non-policy coefficients on model dynamics. The fixedpolicy counterfactual responses of output and inflation also are larger (more negative) than
the unrestricted responses, but not as much as when holding the non-policy coefficients
fixed. Variation in non-policy coefficients holding the Taylor Rule fixed also produces more
heterogeneous responses across subsamples, but the heterogeneity is not economically large.
25

Figures 5 and 6 exclude the VAR because its distinction between structure and reduced-form is less
precise.
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To summarize the dynamics results, changes in model coefficients have modest economic
effects on dynamics when all coefficients are allowed change. Changes in subsets of the
coefficients alter dynamic responses by magnitudes that are larger and economically more
important, but these effects largely offset when all model coefficients are allowed to change.

6.3

Output Gaps

Figure 7 plots the DSGE output gaps for all samples along with the CBO output gap for
comparison. Unlike the CBO output gap, changes in model coefficients across subsamples
influence the estimated DSGE output gap and cause discontinuities across subsamples. The
full-sample DSGE and CBO gaps are positively correlated and have comparable levels until
about 1970. After that the DSGE gap diverges by many percentage points and becomes very
persistent, rarely crossing zero. The magnitude of divergence is economically meaningful for
monetary policy responses to output gaps in the Taylor Rule for all models. The divergence
also may be a concern for construction and interpretation of the two gaps.26
Figure 7 shows the DSGE output gap exhibits economically significant breaks across
subsamples. The period-I and full-sample DSGE gaps are similar, and both are fairly close
to the CBO gap. During the Great Moderation, however, the period-II DSGE gap is roughly
3-5 percentage points below the full-sample DSGE gap and crosses zero multiple times. After
the GFC, the period-III and full-sample DSGE output gaps are about the same magnitude
again and follow a similar U-shaped path. However, the period-III DSGE gap returns to
zero faster and arrives there by 2020 like the CBO gap. In contrast, the full-sample DSGE
gap is still around -4 percent. This discrepancy has major implications for the determination
of optimal monetary (and fiscal) policy during the COVID-19 recession and recovery.
Subsample breaks in the DSGE output gap provide complementary evidence of structural
breaks in the DSGE model coefficients. The results in Section 5 suggest that changes in
long-run coefficients like the steady-state growth rate likely play an important role, but
26

The original DSGE gap in Smets and Wouters (2007) was estimated through 2004 and corresponds more
closely the CBO gap. See the Appendix for more details.
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changes in coefficients associated with wage-price block and Taylor Rule may also contribute.
Alternatively, the results in this subsection may reflect the impact of the omission of explicit
UMP in the macro model equations. Either way, failure to allow for structural breaks in
model coefficients appears to lead to bias in the estimated full-sample DSGE output gap for
long periods.

7

Explaining Structural Breaks

Existence of economically and statistically significant structural breaks in Taylor Rule and
non-policy coefficients makes inference about cause(s) of the breaks much more difficult. If
breaks occurred only in the Taylor Rule, it might be possible to discern shifts due to UMP.
But with non-policy coefficients changing and the models omitting explicit specification
of UMP, it is not feasible to identify breaks induced by UMP. Future research requires
two extensions of the benchmark macro models. First, the models must incorporate timevariation in non-policy variables and equations. Second, the models must explicitly specify
UMP. This section suggests a road map for these complex tasks, which are beyond the scope
of this paper.

7.1

Non-policy Time Variation

Several branches of the literature document and explain time variation in macroeconomic
models. This subsection briefly summarizes selected topics and papers related to our results.
Trend growth/productivity – The DSGE steady state (trend) growth rate changed over
time. One likely reason is trend breaks in productivity (total factor or labor), as documented
in Fernald (2014), which may also lead to variation in the marginal product of capital.
Endogenizing the processes of technical change and productivity growth may be productive.
Natural real rate of interest – The natural real interest rate (r in equation 1) is a fixed the
benchmark models, but Del Negro et al (2019) shows it varied widely over our full sample,
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rising then falling to its lowest level during period III; our real rate estimates show a similar
decline.27 Time-variation in the natural rate might follow Laubach and Williams (2003).
Their calculation of the natural real rate of interest, r∗ = σ1 γ̄ + β, and its law of motion,
rt∗ = cγ̄t + zt ,

(16)

would be added to the Taylor Rule, where steady state growth is allowed to vary over time
(γ̄t ) while zt captures other determinants of rt∗ , such as household rate of time preference.
Inflation target – The benchmark models also assume the inflation target, π, is fixed.
However, inflation volatility during the Great Inflation and the subsequent steady decline
(“opportunistic disinflation,” Orphanides and Wilcox 2002) suggest the target also may be
time varying and merit inclusion in the benchmark models.
Policy maker preferences – The structural break in Taylor Rule coefficients during the
Great Moderation (period II) has been described as a shift in the preferences of FOMC
members toward favoring inflation stability.28 Bordo and Istrefi (2018) examine the Fed’s
overall preference through the window of individual FOMC members tending to place a
higher weight on the inflation gap (“Hawk”) or output gap (“Dove”) in setting the interest
rate and find the FOMC shifted significantly toward being dominated by Doves after the
GFC (period III). This observation is roughly consistent with the estimated Taylor Rules in
period III, which generally show a small decline in ϕπ relative to ϕy .29 Time varying policy
maker preferences could be modeled with ϕπ and ϕy as functions of FOMC composition over
time. Kocherlakota (2018) goes further arguing that policy makers have private information
about their objectives (which may be influenced by non-economic factors) that only affects
27
As noted earlier, our estimates of the natural real interest rate are consistent with Smets and Wouters
(2007) original estimate of r∗ , it is considerably above the traditional estimate in the literature. Holston et
al (2018) estimated the natural rate of interest to be close to zero after the financial crisis, and Del Negro et
al (2019) estimate it to be slightly above one. Resolving these large inconsistencies around r∗ is a key step
to explaining structural breaks.
28
For examples, see Canova (2009), Castelnuovo (2012), Ilbas (2012), and Lakdawala (2016)
29
Debortoli and Nunes (2014) caution against interpreting structural shifts in the policy rule as simply a
change in preferences, noting that shifts in the policy rule can obscure differences between factors inside and
outside a policy maker’s control.
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economic outcomes through the policy choice and thus acts like a taste shifter. If so, the
unconditional independence of policy rules assumed in the benchmark macro models would
be violated.
Phillips Curve and price stickiness – The slope of the NK Phillips Curve and the
underlying degree of nominal price and wage stickiness changed, as noted in Kim et al. (2014)
and Jorgenson and Lansing (2021), for examples. Trend developments such as improving
information technology, declining influence of unions, and other factors may have influenced
nominal stickiness and could be introduced to the models.
Rational expectations and monetary policy transparency – Estimated increases in
coefficients on inflation expectations show growing importance of expectations. U.S. monetary policy also has embraced the anchoring of inflation to expectations, and has become
more transparent and cooperative with the private sector (Spencer et al. 2013). Capturing
these developments may require introducing time variation in the content and processing of
information, learning, and other dynamics of expectation formation.
Heterogeneous preferences – Risk aversion in consumers declined. Given the challenges
encountered in estimating this parameter (Calvet et al. 2021), it is hard to draw hard
conclusions about the cause(s) of the estimated decline. Nevertheless, benchmark macro
models may need to incorporate time variation in preference heterogeneity.
To summarize, the benchmark macro models may be exhibiting structural breaks in
parameters that actually reflect some or all of these sources of time variation—and perhaps
others not listed—rather than UMP. If so, allowing for more time variation in the models may
either reduce evidence of structural breaks or more clearly identify the presence of breaks
due to UMP. However, incorporating all or even some of these extensions and estimating the
models is a challenging task that is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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7.2

Unconventional Monetary Policies

During and after the GFC, the Federal Reserve implemented a wide range of UMP that
can be classified into three broad categories: 1) forward guidance (FG); 2) quantitative
easing (QE); and 3) expanded liquidity facilities (ELF).30 These new policies and tools are
not in the benchmark macro models and thus may require modification of the Taylor Rule
and/or addition of variables and structural equations (including new policy rules) to properly
capture the effects of UMP.
Forward Guidance (FG) – Developed during the (relatively) low-interest rate period of
the early 2000s, FG was tested first during the subsequent increase of the federal funds rate
in 2004 (Gürkaynak, et al., 2004). The main implementation of FG occurred during the GFC
when the federal funds rate hit the ELB for six years. Rather than using the shadow funds
rate, it may be necessary to insert the prototypical FG model (equation 4) into the benchmark
macro models. Richer specifications of the term structure and expectation formation also
may be needed to identify the effects of UMP properly.
Quantitative Easing (QE) – From 2008-2014, the Fed substantially expanded its Open
Market Operations (OMO) to conduct large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) of: 1) mortgagebacked securities, to ease bank risk and lower mortgage rates; and 2) longer term Treasury
bonds, to increase maturity and lower long-term risk-free rates. This QE strategy added
two new dimensions to monetary policy. One is a simple balance sheet rule(s) like those
proposed in Sims and Wu (2021), Sims et al (2021), and Dean (2021) that emulates the
Taylor formula:
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Bt = ρB Bt−1 + (1 − ρB )[θπ (πt − π ∗ ) + θx xt ] + νt

(17)

where Bt is the Fed’s holding of long-term bonds. Dean (2021) also adds a term structure
30

For more details of these policies, see https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm.
In practice, the FOMC appears to implement such a rule as changes in Fed’s target purchases of QE
securities. See the November 22-23 FOMC statement for details.
31
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equation to the model. The other dimension is a de facto long-term target(s) and rule(s)
for mortgage and/or Treasury bond rates. While Fed does not explicitly specify target longterm rates, the balance sheet rule implicitly suggests one. Most likely, macro models need
to introduce explicit specifications of QE policies and asset-pricing equation(s) to identify
the effects of UMP properly.32
Expanded Liquidity Facilities (ELF) – During and after the Financial Crisis, the Fed
developed new policy tools to provide liquidity and improve functioning of financial markets.
One type includes new short-term rates: 1) interest on excess reserves (IOER), which was
replaced by interest on reserve balances (IORB) in 2021 after required reserves were eliminated; and 2) interest rates on overnight reverse repurchase agreements (ONRRP), a form
of OMO. It is unclear whether more than one short-term rate is needed in the benchmark
macro models, but it has been suggested that IORB should replace fed funds as the policy
instrument.33 . More research is needed to understand relationships among the short-term
rates and the fed funds target range, especially how liquidity shortages emerge and cause
financial instabilities that spill over into the real economy. Because IORB is the price that
clears the market for bank (excess) reserves, it also is closely related to QE policies. A second type of new liquidity tool includes a variety of facilities that provide liquidity directly to
banks, borrowers, and investors in key credit markets – some of which have expired.34 These
other facilities are mainly relevant during liquidity crises and the Fed has demonstrated a
willingness to start and stop facilities as needed. Introduction of such intermittent policy
tools may also be needed in macro models but seems particularly challenging to specify.
To recap, observed structural breaks in the Taylor Rule may reflect the effects of omitting
32

Modeling UMP became even more challenging in 2020 with two new responses to the COVID-19 pandemic: 1) expanded QE that included purchases of investment-grade corporate bonds via the Secondary
Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) and short-term state and local government notes via the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF); and 2) new direct lending to small and medium-sized businesses via the
Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) and the Main Street Lending Program.
33
Former New York Fed President Bill Dudley argued recently the fed funds rate target (range)
has become irrelevant so the Fed should drop it altogether and use the IOER (IORB) instead. See
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-24/the-fed-s-interest-rate-target-is-obsolete
34
See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm

28

variables and equations associated with UMP. If so, expanding the macro models to incorporate the UMP and related non-policy equations may be necessary to fully and properly
capture the effects of UMP. Recent research is developing theoretical foundations for some
types of UMP.35 However, no theoretical model includes all elements of UMP, and there is
little or no estimation of such models. Addressing these deficiencies is important for future
research.

8

Conclusions

Three classes of benchmark macroeconomic models exhibit economically and statistically
significant breaks in their Taylor Rule and non-policy coefficients after 2007:Q3. Evidence
of breaks is stronger and more widespread in the larger DSGE model. The main result
pertaining to the Taylor rule is a decline in the strength of the Fed’s response to inflation
relative to its response to output, making the Taylor Rule somewhat more similar to its
form in the period before the Great Moderation. A structural break(s) was likely given the
implementation of UMP that are not included explicitly in the benchmark models. However,
it is unclear whether these widespread and heterogeneous breaks reflect the effects of UMP
or something else. And, perhaps surprisingly, using a shadow rate to control for UMP and
avoid the ELB does not alter the estimation outcomes much.
The observed structural breaks are heterogeneous and challenging to interpret well. One
complicating factor is that breaks in non-policy coefficients influence the models as much or
more than breaks in the Taylor Rule coefficients. Thus, many elements of the benchmark
models may be susceptible to time variation that is not included in them. The first important
task is to build and estimate a macro model(s) that incorporate some or all of the timevarying elements that are clouding inference about the effects of UMP. Then testing the
revised model for structural breaks is more likely to identify the effects of UMP.
35

Examples include Gertler and Karadi (2013), Hagedorn et al. (2019), and Sims and Wu (2021); Dean
(2021) adds average inflation targeting (AIT).
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A second complicating factor is that the benchmark macro models do not include explicit
specifications of UMP. Consequently, the observed structural breaks may be simply reflecting
the estimation effects of omitted variables (and equations) rather than UMP. A form of the
Lucas Critique (1978) also may be at work. After controlling for potential time-variation
in macro models, the obvious remedy is to include explicit specifications of FG (augmented
Taylor Rule or more), QE, and possibly ELP into the model(s). Testing for structural
breaks in the revised model’s non-policy block of equations should more effectively identify
the effects of the introduction of UMP.
Neither the task of controlling for time-variation in macro models nor the task of introducing explicit UMP instruments and rules is easy or fast. However, both are potentially
important directions for future research and analysis of modern monetary policy.
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Online Appendix
A

Bayesian Estimation Priors

The prior distributions, means, and standard deviations used in estimation, given in Table
4, are similar to those used in Canova (2009) for the NK model. The slope of the IS curve, ψ,
and Phillips Curve, κ, have gamma distributions with a prior mean of -.5 and 1, respectively.
The inflation feedback parameter, β, has a beta distribution and a prior mean near a rational
expectations benchmark at .98. The monetary parameters are set at ρ = .8, ϕy = .5 and
ϕπ = 1.3. Additionally, the prior for the inflation parameter, ϕπ is truncated at 1 to not
allow indeterminacy.
For the DSGE model, we use the same priors as Smets and Wouters (2007), given in
Table 5. The time preference rate is set at 0.25 (corresponding to β = .9975), the steady
state inflation (π̄) and growth rate (γ̄) are set at 0.62 and and .4, respectively (corresponding
to an annualized 2.5% inflation rate and 1.6% real growth rate). Steady state hours, ¯l, is
set at 0, Firsh elasticity, σl , is 2, while risk aversion, σc , and habit formation, λ, are set at
1.5 and .7, respectively. The Calvo parameters, ξp and ξw , are both .5, and wage and price
indexation, (ιp , ιw ) are also .5. Finally, capacity utilization, ψ, is set at .5, and the fixed
cost and capital shares (Φ and α) are 1.25 and .3, respectively. The monetary autoregressive
parameter, ρ, is set at .75, and the monetary feedback parameters, ϕπ , ϕy , ϕ∆y are set at 1.5,
.12, and .12, respectively, Similar to the NK model, the prior for ϕπ is truncated at 1 to
require determinacy.

B Additional Diagnostics
This section reports and discusses results of additional diagnostic analyses for model estimation not included in Section 6.
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B.1

Non-monetary Structural Shocks

The monetary structural shocks for the NK and DSGE models are shown in Figure 3 of
Section 6. Here, Figure 9 and Figure 10 plot the non-monetary structural shocks from the
NK (η) and DSGE models (ε). In addition to the model parameters, the shock structure is
highly variable between periods. The variance ratios of the shocks can be found in Table 6,
and the autocorrelations are in Table 7.
For the NK model, the relative variance of the output gap shock is larger than its full
sample estimate in period I. It declines from the period I and period II (from 1.42 to .61), but
increases substantially to 3.30 times the full sample shock variance in the final subperiod. On
the other hand, the inflation shock is similarly unstable between periods I and II (1.36 and
1.63 times the full sample variance, respectively), but is considerably more stable in period III
(.88 times the full sample variance), when inflation was more stable. The output gap shock’s
persistence is largely stable between the Great Moderation and post-Crisis, shifting from .79
to .87. Meanwhile, The inflation shock is highly persistent and near unity in periods I and II.
However, the persistence declines substantially in period III (from .99 to .65), corresponding
to the lower variance in the inflation shock.
For the DSGE model, the shock structure is similarly unstable between subperiods. The
productivity, risk premium, spending, investment, and price markup shocks each have a
higher variance in period I than their full-sample estimates, varying from 2.19 (risk premium)
to 1.11 (spending). Each then declines between period I and period II with the risk premium
shock declining the most (from 2.19 to .76) and the spending shock declining the least (from
1.11 to .85). The wage markup shock has a lower variance in period I than its full sample
estimate (.48), and the variance of the wage markup shock increases between periods I and
II (to .80). The DSGE model struggles to fit period III, as only the variance of the spending
shock declines between periods II and III, declining from .85 to .64. The relative variance
of the productivity and investment shocks increases the least (both from .78 to .95), while
the relative variance of the wage markup shock increases the most (from .80 to 1.77). Only
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the persistence of the productivity and wage markup shocks decline between periods I and
II (from .99 to .92 and from .94 to .78, respectively). The persistence of the spending shock
increases the least (from .90 to .96) and the persistence of the risk premium shock increases
the most (from .24 to .74). Alternatively, between periods II and III, only the risk premium
shock becomes more persistent (from .74 to .79). While each remaining shock’s persistence
declines in period III, the wage markup shock declines the most, from .78 to .21.

B.2

Non-Monetary Impulse Responses

The main text focuses on the responses of the benchmark models to innovations in the
monetary policy shock, which is common to all three models and directly relevant to the
Taylor Rule. We do not include impulse responses to the other structural shocks here for
two reasons. The non-monetary shocks are not easily compared across models and the sheer
number of responses requires too much textual discussion. However, the full set of impulse
responses is available upon request.

B.3

Output Gaps

Extending the sample for the DSGE model from Smets and Wouter’s (2007) original estimation (red line ending in 2004) to our sample period (blue line ending in 2019) drastically
changes the DSGE output gap, as shown in Figure 8. The original DSGE gap (red line) is
close to the CBO gap until the mid-1970s, when it fell well below the CBO gap before catching up to the CBO gap in the late 1980s. Adding 15 more years of data to the estimation
largely resolves the discrepancy in the 1970s and 1980s. However, it introduces a new, even
larger discrepancy between the DSGE and CBO gaps from the late 1980s through 2019 as
noted in the main text.
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C Tables and Figures
Figure 1: The Wu-Xia Shadow Rate and the Fed’s bond holdings
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Figure 2: P-value from endogenous breakpoint Chow test
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Figure 3: Structural monetary shocks by model and sample

44

Figure 4: Impulse response to a 100bp monetary shock by model and sample
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Figure 5: Counterfactual responses to a 100bp monetary shock by model and sample

46

Figure 6: Counterfactual responses to a 100bp monetary shock by model and sample

47

Figure 7: Estimated Output Gaps
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Table 1: Summary of structural break literature
Paper

Sample

Break(s)

Taylor Rule Implications

Nonpolicy Implications

Estrella and Fuhrer (2003)

1966-1997

early-1980s

backward looking models are more stable than forward looking

N/A

Duffy and Engle-Warnick (2006)

1955-2003

1980

↓ ϕy

NA

Bernanke and Mihov (1998)

1965-1996

1979 & 1982

no policy variable captures monetary policy

NA

Clarida et al. (2000)

1960-1996

1979

↑ ϕπ , ↑ ϕy

Taylor Rule induces determinacy

Smets and Wouters (2007)

1954-2007

early-1980s

↑ ϕπ , ↓ ϕy

More flexible prices

Canova (2009)

1955-2002

1982

↑ ϕπ

Flatter IS Curve

Castelnuovo (2012)

1966-2007

1970s

Including M2 improves fit before 1970s

Omission of M2 produces distorted IRFs
Lower inflation target

Ilbas (2012)

1966-2005

early-1980s

↑ ϕr , ↑ ϕπ

Bunzel and Enders (2010)

1965-2007

early-1980s

↑ ϕr , ↑ ϕπ

NA

Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)

1960-2002

early-1980s

↑ ϕπ , ↑ ϕ∆y , ↓ ϕy

Lower trend inflation

Sims and Zha (2006)

1959-2003

late-1970s, mid-1980s

↓ variance of ϕπ , ϕy

NA

Primiceri (2005)

1953-2001

early-1980s

↓ variance of ϕπ , ϕy , ↑ ϕπ

NA

Mavroeidis (2010)

1961-2006

1979

TR cannot be accurately estimated after 1979

NA

Dean and Schuh

1960-2020

1984, 2008

1984: ↑ ϕπ , 2008: ↓ ϕπ , ϕy

Flatter Phillips Curve, lower trend growth
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Table 2: Taylor Rule estimates by subsample and model
Parameter Estimates
Parameter
ϕπ
VAR
ϕy

ρ

ϕπ

Changes

Full

I

II

IIIr̂

IIIr

3.55

1.43

2.67

-1.61

.24

(1.61)

(1.51)

(1.23)

(1.77)

(.89)

4.05

1.26

3.10

1.64

1.37

(.68)

(1.03)

(.45)

(.50)

(.06)

.91

.83

.83

.86

.81

(.02)

(.07)

(.04)

(.03)

(.04)

1.37

1.27

2.41

1.31

1.24

[1.16,1.62] [1.00,1.47] [2.30,2.55]

NK
ϕy

ρ

ϕπ
DSGE
ϕy

ρ

ϕ∆y

II-IIIr̂

II-IIIr

1.24

-4.28***

-2.43**

1.84**

-1.43***

-1.73***

.00

.03

-.02

1.14

-1.1

-1.17

-.16

-.05

-.38

-.01

.16

.04

.49

-.55

-.53

-.06

.12

.06

.04

-.09

.08

-.01

.04

-.07

[1.00,1.57] [1.00,1.50]

.99

.85

.69

.64

.31

[.75,1.26]

[.62,1.06]

[.43,.99]

[.38,.93]

[.17,.44]

.79

.63

.62

.78

.66

[.70,.88]

[.50,.74]

[.54,.68]

[.68,.88]

[.57,.76]

1.99

1.48

1.97

1.42

1.44

[1.57,2.41] [1.26,1.69] [1.58,2.36]

I-II

[1.27,1.57] [1.23,1.47]

.30

.15

.09

.21

.15

[.25,.34]

[.09,.20]

[.02,.17]

[.14,.28]

[.10,.20]

.86

.80

.84

.75

.92

[.82,.89]

[.74,.87]

[.79,.88]

[.65,.86]

[.88,.96]

.41

.17

.16

.20

.09

[.37,.44]

[.13,.22]

[.11,.21]

[.12,.27]

[.06,.13]

Note: VAR estimates report the standard errors, and the NK and DSGE models report the 90% HPD confidence
interval.
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Table 3: Structural Estimates from New Keynesian and Bayesian DSGE Model
Parameter Output
Parameter
VAR

κ

ψ

Parameter Role
Phillips Curve

IS Curve

NK
κ

β

Phillips Curve

Inflation feedback

100(β −1 − 1)

Time Preference

π̄

Steady State Inflation

γ̄

¯l

Steady State Growth

Steady State Hours

DSGE
ρ

σc

λ

ξw

σl

ξp

ιw

ιp

ψ

Φ

α
r∗

Investment Adjustment

Risk Aversion

External Habit Degree

Calvo: Wages

Frisch Elasticity

Calvo: Prices

Wage Indexation

Price Indexation

Capacity Utilization Cost

Fixed Cost Share

Capital Share
Real Interest Rate

Change

Full

I

II

IIIî

.01

-.01

-.02

.13

(.03)

(.04)

(.04)

(.05)

-.02

-.07

-.03

-.19

[.01,.03]

[.01,.12]

[.01,.06]

[.01,.38]

.02

.02

.38

.03

[.01,.03]

[.01,.03]

[.32,.42]

[.01,.04]

.70

.69

.91

.82

[.61,.79]

[.53,.87]

[.87,.95]

[.61,.99]

.25

.18

.17

.23

[.16,.34]

[.07,.30]

[.06,.29]

[.09,.37]

.65

.70

.68

.65

[.55,.73]

[.51,.86]

[.56,.84]

[.53,.78]

.33

.27

.48

.21

[.28,.36]

[.17,.38]

[.42,.53]

[.16,.27]

-1.94

2.72

.79

-3.52

[-3.41,-.54]

[1.28,4.33]

[-1.36,2.46]

[-4.76,-2.38]

7.95

4.70

6.38

6.31

[6.04,9.55]

[3.11,6.19]

[4.14,8.66]

[4.28,8.13]

1.53

1.64

1.25

.93

[1.22,1.83]

[1.25,1.98]

[.81,1.75]

[.72,1.13]

.74

.67

.52

.82

[.68,.80]

[.60,.75]

[.39,.67]

[.76,.89]

.93

.75

.69

.73

[.91,.95]

[.67,.83]

[.52,.89]

[.63,.89]

2.62

1.97

2.20

.97

[1.75,3.31]

[1.09,3.09]

[1.16,3.37]

[.25,1.75]

.83

.55

.81

.71

[.80,.87]

[.50,.60]

[.74,.88]

[.60,.83]

.72

.48

.46

.41

[.62,.82]

[.28,.67]

[.17,.74]

[.17,.65]

.20

.37

.35

.33

[.10,.32]

[.16,.62]

[.12,.60]

[.13,.52]

.55

.28

.68

.71

[.42,.69]

[.12,.42]

[.46,.88]

[.54,.91]

1.69

1.55

1.53

1.42

[1.59,1.80]

[1.40,1.68]

[1.32,1.70]

[1.27,1.57]

.22

.24

.21

.12

[.20,.25]

[.19,.28]

[.15,.26]

[.07,.16]

3.04

2.50

3.09

1.71

I-II Change

II-IIIî Change

.02

.11***

.04

-.16

.36

-.35

.22

-.09

-.01

.06

-.02

-.03

.21

-.27

-1.93

-4.31

1.68

-.07

-.39

-.32

-.15

.30

-.06

.04

.23

-1.23

.26

-.10

-.02

-.05

-.02

-.02

.4

.03

-.02

-.13

-.03

-.09

.59

-1.38

Note: VAR estimates report the standard errors, and the NK and DSGE models report the 90% HPD confidence interval.
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Figure 8: Original versus Updated DSGE Output Gaps
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Figure 9: Structural shocks (η) from NK model
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Figure 10: Structural shocks (ε) from DSGE model
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Model

Parameter

Table 4: Estimation Priors
Parameter Role
Prior Distribution

ψ

IS curve slope

Gamma

κ

Phillips Curve slope

Gamma

β

Inflation Expectation feedback

Beta

ρ

Monetary smoothing

Beta

ϕπ

Taylor Rule: Inflation

Normal

ϕy

Taylor Rule: Output

Beta

NK
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Prior Mean
-.50
(.35)
1.00
(2.00)
.98
(.05)
.8
(.25)
1.3
(.5)
.5
(.25)

Model

Parameter

Table 5: Estimation Priors
Parameter Role
Prior Distribution

100(β −1 − 1)

Time Preference Rate

Gamma

π̄

Steady State Inflation

Gamma

γ̄

Steady State Growth Rate

Normal

¯l

Steady State Hours

Normal

ρ

Investment Adjustment Cost

Normal

σc

Risk Aversion

Normal

λ

External Habit Degree

Beta

ξw

Calvo Parameter: Wages

Beta

σl

Frisch Elasticity

Normal

ξp

Calvo Parameter: Prices

Beta

ιw

Indexation to Past Wages

Beta

ιp

Indexation to Past Prices

Beta

ψ

Capacity Utilization Cost

Beta

Φ

Fixed Cost Share

Normal

α

Capital Share

Normal

ρ

Monetary smoothing

Beta

ϕπ

Taylor Rule: Inflation

Normal

ϕy

Taylor Rule: Output

Normal

ϕ∆y

Taylor Rule: Growth

Normal

DSGE
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Prior Mean
.25
(.10)
.62
(.10)
.40
(.10)
.00
(2.00)
4.00
(1.50)
1.50
(.37)
.70
(.10)
.50
(.10)
2.00
(.75)
.50
(.10)
.50
(.15)
.50
(.15)
.50
(.15)
1.25
(.12)
.30
(.05)
.75
(.1)
1.5
(.25)
.12
(.05)
.12
(.05)

Model

VAR

NK

DSGE

Table 6: Structural shock standard deviation
Ratio to
Parameter
Role
FS
I
II
.74
σty
Output Gap
1.25 .62
(.03)
.31
σtπ
Inflation
1.28 .63
(.01)
.78
1.43 .52
σti
Monetary
(.04)
.10
ηty
Output Gap
1.42 .61
[.06,.13]
.11
ηtπ
Inflation
1.36 1.63
[.08,.14]
.80
.95 .50
ηti
Monetary
[.74,.87]
.47
ϵat
Productivity
1.22 .78
[.44,.51]
.12
ϵbt
Risk Premium
2.19 .76
[.11,.13]
.47
ϵgt
Spending
1.11 .85
[.44,.50]
.40
ϵit
Investment
1.20 .78
[.34,.46]
.85
ϵm
Monetary
.22 .14
t
[.78,.90]
.14
1.21 .58
ϵpt
Price Markup
[.13,.16]
.36
ϵw
Wage Markup
.48 .80
t
[.32,.39]
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FS
III
.78
.58
.41
3.30
.88
.29
.95
1.13
.64
.95
.40
1.07
1.77

Table 7: Structural Shock Persistence
Model

Parameter
ρY

NK

Parameter Role
Output Gap
Shock

ρπ

Inflation Shock

ρi

Monetary Shock

ρa
ρb
DSGE

Productivity
Shock
Risk Premium
Shock

ρg

Spending Shock

ρi

Investment Shock

ρr

Monetary Shock

ρp
ρw

Price Markup
Shock
Wage Markup
Shock

Full
.92
[.88,.95]
.99
[.98,.99]
.34
[.13,.53]
.99
[.99,.99]
.94
[.92,.95]
.96
[.94,.98]
.72
[.64,.82]
.14
[.05,.21]
.93
[.89,.97]
.30
[.16,.45]

I
.90
[.84,.96]
.99
[.97,.99]
.49
[.34,.64]
.99
[.98,.99]
.24
[.07,.42]
.90
[.84,.95]
.61
[.47,.78]
.29
[.13,.45]
.65
[.29,.99]
.94
[.89,.99]

II
.79
[.74,.85]
.99
[.99,.99]
.60
[.42,.72]
.92
[.87,.98]
.74
[.22,.93]
.96
[.94,.99]
.70
[.55,.84]
.31
[.13,.51]
.75
[.55,.93]
.78
[.50,.97]

III
.87
[.78,.99]
.65
[.42,.84]
.51
[.25,.81]
.84
[.78,.91]
.79
[.72,.86]
.78
[.63,.93]
.58
[.31,.82]
.51
[.33,.68]
.55
[.31,.81]
.21
[.04,.37]

I-II Change

II-III Change

-.11

.08

0

-.34

.11

-.09

-.07

-.08

.50

.05

.06

-.18

.09

-.12

.02

.2

.10

-.2

-.16

-.55

The VAR’s shock persistence is simply the autoregressive parameter from each equation in
the model.
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